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ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, EXTER-
NALITIES, AND CONVENTIONAL 
ECONOMIC WISDOM: 
A CRITIQUE 
By R. C. d' Arge-) and E. K. H unt<··:· 
In the technical jargon of economics the word "externalities" is 
used to refer to the ways in which acts of production, market 
transactions, or consuming affect people who are not directly in-
volved in those acts. For example, the purchase of and operation 
of an automobile by one individual affects other individuals in 
increasing the likelihood of the other individual's: having an ac-
cident; being caught in heavy traffic; or suffering from vehicle 
exhaust gases; increased noise, higher taxes for highway construc-
tion, and ultimately from despoilation of the landscape by vehicle 
carcasses. The individual in purchasing the vehicle generally does 
not consider these environmental effects on his fellow men. Con-
ventional wisdom in economics maintains that the individual does 
not pay for such disamenities and therefore is unaware of 
them; or, if aware, self-interest precludes individual action. If he 
were made to pay, so goes the conventional wisdom, then the 
market for the purchasing of automobiles would become efficient 
in the allocation of resources. 
In everyday parlance, the word "externalities," more often 
than not, refers to pollution of all kinds. Externalities stemming 
from pollution traditionally have not received much attention 
from economists. They have been treated as exceptional and, by 
implication, unimportant problems which can easily be resolved. 
Perhaps such complacency was warranted when economies were 
largely agrarian with no population concentrations, and the ex-
tent of externalities was the infrequent antagonism of displaced 
indian tribes. Such an economy is long past, but the treatment of 
externalities in economics, even in many recent theoretical analy-
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ses, borders on the notion that externalities are "freakish anoma-
lies easily adjusted for within an otherwise perfectly functioning 
competitive system." 
In this paper, we endeavor to demonstrate that the entire nor-
mative framework within which most economists have treated 
externalities in the past is at least partially defective. Its defects 
in many instances are so devastatingly complete that we do not 
believe progress can be made in understanding and resolving the 
social and economic problem of environmental pollution and 
degradation unless economics radically reorients its entire frame 
of reference. Our purpose here is to point out the necessity of a 
change in economic viewpoint, and attempt to sketch a very 
crude road map toward reorientation. 
A BRIEF SKETCH OF ORTHODOXY 
The conventional intellectual tradition in economic theory, 
covering at least the last two hundred years, rests squarely upon 
hedonistic preconceptions. I t contains both a psychological 
hedonism and an ethical hedonism. The psychological hedonism 
was, in the late nineteenth century, a rather crude theory of hu-
man behavior. Men were pictured as being concerned primarily, if 
not wholly, with maximizing individually derived utility or mini-
mizing disutility, both conceived in strictly hedonistic terms. In 
more recent times, the naivety of treating utility as a stable, 
cardinally quantifiable relationship between a man and a con-
sumable object was ostensibly circumvented with the develop-
ment of "indifference" analysis. l But indifference analyis only 
substituted ordinal quantifiability for cardinal quantifiability-
hardly a drastic modification. 
Finally, nearly a century after hedonistic psychology had 
been thoroughly discredited, economists announced that they 
were abandoning psychological premises and using only be-
havioral axioms that were intuitively obvious.2 The "substitute" 
for the older view was to assume that all individuals, regardless of 
the nature of their motives, preferred some things to other things. 
If these self-centered preferences were reasonably stable, econo-
mists needed only posit a preference ordering that could take the 
place of the utility relationship. Preference orderings were, of 
course, just another name for the hedonistic preconceptions which 
most economists brought with them to their analyses.3 
The ethical hedonism in orthodox economics has been called 
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"the pig principle" by Professor S. S. Alexander. The pig principle 
is simply "that if you like something, more is better."4 Thus, the 
ultimate normative principle of Benthamite Economics was that 
more pleasure is better than less and the level of my pleasure is 
unrelated to yours; for late 19th century neoclassical economists it 
was that more utility is always ethically better than less utility; 
the modern version is that a preferred position on one's individual 
preference ordering is ethically better than a less preferred posi-
tion. 
These different forms of economic hedonism have only one 
consequential difference. In Bentham's hands the notion of dimin-
ishing marginal utility had uncomfortably radical egalitarian 
implications, namely an equal distribution of income. But, ac-
cording to Joan Robinson, "the method by which the egalitarian 
element in the doctrine was sterilized was mainly by slipping from 
utility to physical output as the object to be maximized."/) 
Modern micro-economic welfare theory begins by describing an 
economic system in which: (1) market choices by consumers are 
determined by a coherent subjective preference ordering; (2) the 
decisions concerning what commodity mix to produce and how to 
produce it are governed solely by the desire of producers to maxi-
mize profits; (3) buyers and sellers are pitted against each other in 
a market which is so large that no individual buyer or seller can, 
through his own purchases or sales, affect the market price; and 
(4) however much one consumer consumes he is unaffected by 
what others have to consume, or breathe. This last assumption 
could very well be called the second "pig principle". 
From certain axioms about the nature of consumer preference 
orderings and the technical relationships between inputs and out-
puts, a consistent line of deductive reasoning leads to the conclu-
sion that an economic system of this description will allocate its 
resources in such a way that any possible change in production, 
distribution or consumption that could possibly make one person 
better off (leave him in a preferred position) could only be brought 
about by making someone else worse off (leave him in a less pre-
ferred position). In short, resources would be efficiently allocated 
so that, given existing tastes, the supposition of individual 
oriented desires, and the existing income distribution, it would be 
impossible to augment the aggregate value of production through 
a reallocation. 
It is then argued that scientific objectivity prohibits the econo-
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mist from making a normative choice between two situations 
which involve the bettering of one person or class of persons at the 
expense of another person or class of persons. Hence the conclu-
sion is reached that the cri terion of "economic efficiency" is sci-
entific, whereas the criterion of "equity" or the distribution of 
income is not. The competitive capitalist economy is shown most 
perfectly to satisfy the criterion of "economic efficiency."6 There-
fore, no other system can, on "objective and scientific" grounds 
alone, be shown to represent an improvement over this capitalist 
price-market system. By extension, this doctrine becomes a claim 
that laissez-faire capitalism at least represents one of the best of 
all possible worlds. 
The criterion of economic efficiency is a part of what economists 
call the norm of Paretian optimality (named for the Italian 
Economist Vilfredo Pareto). This norm of optimality can be de-
fended only on the assumption that the structure of relative 
prices embodies the ultimate moral principle upon which moral 
judgments are based. It was in recognition of this fact that the 
Austrian school of neoclassical economists laid so much emphasis 
on the notion of a "rational price structure." For them the state-
ment that the capitalist market system created a rational price 
structure was tantamount to giving the pig principle its place as 
the foundation of all social and moral judgments. The rationality 
of the price system supposedly derived from its reflection of the 
relative strengths of the desires of the persons within the social 
system (ignoring the income distribution problem). 
There are, however, many potential flaws in the system which 
make the achievement of Paretian optimality improbable, if not 
impossible. The principle's admitted weaknesses are: (1) Some 
buyers and sellers are large enough to control prices and, more-
over, the economies of large-scale production seem to render this 
inevitable. (2) Some commodities are "consumed socially" and 
their production and sale would seldom be profitable in a laissez-
faire capitalist economy even though they may be deemed highly 
desirable by most ci tizens wi thin the econom y (e.g., roads, schools, 
armies, etc.). (3) The costs to the producer of a commodity may 
differ significantly from the social costs of producing that com-
modity, so that it is possible that for society as a whole the real 
costs of production exceed the benefits for the commodity even 
though the producer may still profit from its production. (For 
example, a steel mill may pollute the air with sulphur oxides, 
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particulates, etc. but not bear the costs of the burden placed on 
residents downwind.) And (4) an unrestrained price-market sys-
tem appears to be inherently unstable and is subject to recurring 
depressions that incur enormous social costs. 
The principal differences separating "liberal" economists from 
"conservative" economists stem from an inability to agree on the 
exten t and significance of these flaws. I tis generall y agreed that to 
the degree that the flaws do exist and do disrupt the otherwise 
beneficial workings of the capitalist system, they can be corrected 
by limited government intervention within the market system. 
It is argued that government anti-trust actions can force films 
to act as if they were competitive, and something called "work-
able competition" can be achieved. Roads, education, aesthetic 
vistas free of disruptions, and other socially consumed commodi-
ties can be provided by the government. Extensive systems of 
taxes and subsidies can be used to equate private and social costs 
where they differ due to externalities or other reasons. Finally, 
through the wise use of fiscal and monetary policy the governmen t 
can eliminate the inherent instability of the economic system. 
The flaws are thus seen as minor and ephemeral. An enlightened 
government can correct them and free the "invisible hand" of the 
market once again to create the best of all possible worlds. How-
ever, a rigorous working out of all the implications of this theory 
has led to a fruitless dead end. When pushed to the logical ex-
tremes inherent in it, the theory contains the seeds of its own in-
tellectual destruction. 
A CRITIQUE OF ORTHODOXY 
One of the most devastating attacks came from J. De V. 
Graaff's tightly reasoned book, Theoretical Welfare Economics. 7 
Graaff demonstrated that economists had not really appreciatd 
the long and restrictive list of assumptions necessary for the op-
timally efficient allocation of resources envisioned in the model of a 
competitive, free-market capitalism to be realized. He lists seven-
teen such assumptions which he has shown to be necessary.8 Many 
of them are so restrictive that one must agree with Graff that 
"the measure of acceptance ... [which this theory] has won 
among professional economists would be astonishing were not its 
pedigree so long and respectable."9 A few of Graaff's seventeen 
conditions will suffice to illustrate the flaws. The theory requires: 
(1) that any individual's welfare is identical with his preference 
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ordering, i.e., that children, dope addicts, fiends, criminals, and 
lunatics, as well as all other persons, always prefer that which is 
best for them and society should accept their desires; (2) that 
neither risk nor uncertainty is ever present; (3) that productivity 
is totally unaffected by the existing distribution of wealth; and (4) 
that all capital goods as well as consumer goods are infinitely di-
visible. These represent but four of Graaff's seventeen restrictive 
conditions which must obtain before the price-market system can 
be expected to achieve "optimal economic efficiency" in the 
Paretian sense. 
In light of this, it is obvious that perfect competition could 
never be anything more than a normative model toward which 
government policies might attempt to move a capitalist economy. 
The goal could not possibly ever be achieved. But economists 
soon found that attempts to move toward this goal might just as 
likely move the economy farther from the goal. 
This last point was made in an important piece of iconoclastic 
literature, well known to professional economists as "the theory of 
the second best.lo In the words of the eminen t economist, William 
J. Baumol: 
In brief, this theory [of second best] states, on the basis of a mathe-
matical argument, that in a concrete situation characterized by any 
deviation from "perfect" optimality, partial policy measures which 
eliminate only some of the departures from the optimal arrangement 
may well result in a net decrease in social welfare.ll 
This important argument shows that anti-trust actions, pollution 
taxes, or any other attempts by the government to bring about 
"workable competition" may result in effects diametrically op-
posed to those envisioned by the authors of these policies. 
Further work by Buchanan and Kafoglis12 and Baumoll3 has 
shown that the rather naive faith held by many economists that a 
system of taxes and subsidies could nullify the adverse effects en-
countered when private costs differ from social costs, i.e., when 
externalities appear, was based on an oversimplified view. Baumol 
showed that once again policies based on the traditional argu-
ments sketched earlier may actually diminish rather than aug-
ment social welfare. 
In addition, concerning the stability of the system, Friedmanl4 
and Baumol16 have argued that even if it were practically pos-
sible for monetary and fiscal authorities to use their powers in the 
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manner prescribed in textbooks (and this is a big "if"), and if 
they were helped by a system of "automatic stabilizers," the 
problem of economic instability would probably still be insuper-
able. 
Finally, Arrow has shown that if we adopt consumer sov-
ereignty, i.e., one man has one vote, as a fundamental normative 
criterion and simultaneously deny interpersonal comparisons of 
relative well-being (two of the basic tenets of orthodox economic 
hedonism), then any coherent program of government action 
must be imposed from above. No type of completely democratic 
voting under these two basic assumptions can be shown to yield 
an entirely consistent ordered set of alternatives with which to 
guide government policies.16 
But as devastating as these logical attacks on economic ortho-
doxy have been, the theory is even more vulnerable on psycho-
logical and ethical grounds. One of the most fundamental weak-
nesses, from a normative standpoint, is that the desires which 
give the price system its supposed rationality are themselves 
treated as ultimate, metaphysically immutable givens, each on 
an equal footing with the other. The underlying theory of action 
for the possessors of these desires was most aptly described by 
Veblen: 
[This] conception of man is that of a lightening calculator of plea-
sures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire 
of [individual] happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him 
about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor 
consequent. He is an isolated definitive human datum, in stable 
equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that dis-
place him in one direction or another. Self-imposed in elemental space, 
he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until the paral-
lelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the 
line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he comes 
to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before.17 
Thus the neoclassical theory upon which the criterion of 
efficiency is based completely ignores the social institutions which 
to a large extent determine the types of wants and desires the in-
dividuals in a given social system will have, and the ways in which 
they will attempt to satisfy these desires. The individual desires 
are simply taken as the metaphysically given best criteria of good-
ness and badness. 
Economists have usually been somewhat uncomfortable with 
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this patently untenable version of human nature as can be seen in 
Adam Smith's treatment of "moral sentiments," Ricardo's "hab-
its and customs of the people," and Marshall's "wants adjusted to 
activities." However, when it comes to a defense of the rationality 
of the market price structure and the normative criterion of mar-
ket efficiency these sociological afterthoughts have absolutely no 
place. 
Market efficiency, despite its superficial plausibility as an im-
partial normative criterion, shows itself on examination to be 
virtually worthless. In the words of Joan Robinson, " ... drug 
fiends should be cured: children should go to school. How do we 
decide which preferences should be respected and which restrained 
unless we judge the preferences themselves."18 Indeed, one of the 
central problems with which moral philosophers traditionally 
have been concerned is how to control these preferences and the 
desires which are morally repugnant. A philosophy which elevates 
all desires to the same plane and then makes these desires the ul-
timate criteria of goodness and badness would have been ridi-
culed by any of the important ethical philosophers. 
If, as many social scientists believe, the market and its many 
attendant economic, social and political institutions influence the 
entire fabric of our society, then the traditional handling of ex-
ternalities in economics is completely inadequate. If the social 
process creates desires in the majority of the participants in that 
process which when subjected to some normative criteria are 
morally repugnant, it makes absolutely no sense to ask our parti-
cipants if they would prefer having different preference patterns 
and how much they would be willing to pay for these new pref-
erence patterns. In the words of S. S. Alexander: 
The pig will not want to pay anything to be made into a Socrates. 
That wants are generated by the social process ... in the profound 
sense of the dependence on the whole cultural matrix certainly 
threatens the entire ethical basis of [traditional] economics, striking 
in particular at Pareto optimality. It challenges the principle that more 
is better and opens up the question of what sort of wants we should gen-
erate, what sort of men we should make.19 
It is obvious that the criterion of market efficiency involves a 
sort of egocentric myopia of which one should be wary in any 
serious discussion of normative economics. Such a discussion re-
quires not only an explicit, normative model of the Good Society 
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and the Good Man but also entails the necessity of attempting an 
evaluation of any and all important social and cultural institu-
tions and their relationships to the whole social system. Taking 
wants generated by the system as the ultimate normative criteria 
of the system itself appears to be indefensible. 
And yet it is within this normative context that most discus-
sions of economic externalities take place. The usual approach has 
been to assume that when the production process creates costs the 
producer would not normally bear in a market economy, he should 
be taxed an amount equal to the difference between his private 
costs of production and the total social costs of production. The 
tax should then be given as a subsidy to those who are unwillingly 
forced to bear the excess costs. Presumably these costs would be 
limited to a relatively small number of individuals and each in-
dividual's share of the costs could be reasonably assessed. 
But just how are social costs to be assessed? Here the impor-
tance of the notion of Paretian optimality is crucial. The "ration-
ality" of the price system under conditions ofParetian optimality 
derives from the belief that prices, or individual values and costs, 
perfectly reflect social values and costs. When an externality 
exists it is treated as the only exception to Paretian optimality. It 
is assumed that in the particular productive process, which creates 
this externality, private values differ from social values, or private 
costs differ from social costs, or both. The process of "cost-bene-
fit analysis" then uses a set of other prices (all assumed to be 
Paretian optimal) to impute the correct social values and costs in 
the productive process under consideration. The taxes and sub-
sidies can then easily be applied (in theory, if not in practice), and 
optimality restored. 
It is our contention that this orthodox method of handling ex-
ternalities is completely deficient. There are two reasons, each of 
which is totally nihilistic as far as this theory is concerned. First, 
the bulk of this article, to this point, has attempted to show that 
the whole framework of Paretian optimality is utterly and com-
pletely vulnerable on logical, psychological and ethical grounds. 
If the arguments to this point are accepted the matter would be 
ended and the traditional treatment of externalities thrown out. 
But second, if one continues on pure faith alone to accept the 
Paretian framework, we propose to show that the treatment of 
externalities as "exceptions," which can be corrected with a 
knowledge of many other prices which are Paretian optimal, is 
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un tenable on both theoretical and practical grounds. The basic 
reason for this is the total ubiquity of externalities. 
PERVASIVE EXTERNALITIES 
In the metaphysical system called a market economy any ac-
tion of one individual or enterprise which induces pleasure or pain 
to any other individual or enterprise and is unpriced by a market 
constitutes an externality. Thus, if some guest at a formal dinner 
belches loudly and continuously and this belching causes dis-
comfort to other guests, then the economy is said to be in an in-
efficient state. Of course, we omit consideration of cultures where 
such behavior is taken as indicative of the superior quality of the 
meal. 
A more incisive example of externality is the upwind factory 
that emits large quantities of sulfur oxides and particulate matter 
inducing rising probabilities of emphysema, lung cancer, and 
other respiratory diseases to residents downwind. The externality 
arises because the factory-owners historically have not had to 
bear the burden of health and psychic damages which they 
caused.20 In effect, their use of the air as a medium of waste dis-
posal was (and in most areas still is) unrestricted and free. 
These rather extreme examples underscore the difficulty of 
identifying which social or private actions can be identified with 
externalities and which cannot. Unless people in modern societies 
are completely homogeneous self-serving robots responding only, 
to price and cost, practically any deviant social behavior results in 
an extern ali ty. In fact, one of the reasons ci ted for the founding of 
societies is the common need for protection. Yet protection 
achieved by an individual through group participation is a form 
of reciprocal externality-I receive added protection by your 
presence as you receive added protection from mine. Such bene-
fits of group participation are not priced at all or by a well de-
fined market. We would therefore argue that externalities are a 
normal and inherent part of societies and not some form of iso-
lated, deviant behavior or exceptional outcome. 
The environmental pollution problem is not a problem that can 
be completely corrected unless modern societies revert to the con-
sumption patterns of their agrarian past, or at least to radically 
different life styles. The reason is relatively simple and related to 
the principle of conservation of matter-energy. Whatever is pro-
duced, consumed, and discarded by the modern economy (in 
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terms of weight) is still here and will continue to be. Thus, the 
more material goods generated in an economy, the more airborne, 
waterborne, and solid wastes that will accumulate. Unless man-
kind is able to achieve 100 percent efficiency in recycling (a level 
of efficiency never achieved in any observed production or con-
sumption process), the global economywill continue to generate an 
ever expanding amount of wastes. At current levels of gross na-
tional product in the United States, the economy is already 
"producing" about 6-7 points of "active" waste materials per 
dollar of GNP. Therefore, a trillion dollar economy tends to also 
produce (ignoring inflationary price rises) more than three billion 
tons of waste materials. Thus, on a per capita basis, this amounts 
to more than twelve tons for each American per year. As a basis of 
comparison, pigs of equal weight "produce" less than one ton of 
waste, in terms of mass, per year. 
Another obvious aspect of modern societies is their tendency to-
ward continued growth of population and industry in tightly 
woven clusters within one air basin and/or watershed. Substan-
tial efficiencies are associated with such urbanized connurbations, 
especially with large labor pools, relatively low transportation 
costs, and economies associated with providing some urban ser-
vices such as fire protection, television signals and en tertainmen t. 
Yet, needless to say, such concentrations have universally yielded 
a rapidly deteriorating natural environment as the accumulation 
of waste proceeds. 
To summarize briefly our arguments so far, externalities of all 
kinds are an inherent and important component of all modern so-
cieties. The externality arises because markets cannot instan-
taneously appear and disappear for each act of devian t behavior of 
the economy's citizenry. In other words, there would be extreme 
difficulties for establishing a "new" market, such as buying and 
selling the right to belch, each time one or more individual's ac-
tions impinged upon or aided other individuals. Externalities 
associated with pollution are extremely pervasive elements in 
modern materialistic societies because each act of material con-
sumption or production also involves the production of wastes. 
Urbanization, while efficient for production and consumption, 
also results in the concentration of wastes and their accumulation 
in relatively compact areas. 
THE TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC ANSWER 
Beginning with Pigou, economists have advocated the appli-
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cation of taxes by a governing body to correct market oriented 
economies for the distorting effect of externalities. More recently, 
some economists have advocated several alternative corrective de-
vices including subsidies and standards or ordinances. Basically, 
these three methods of correction all have the same effect-to 
induce individuals or enterprises to be cognizant of their activ-
ities which cause externalities and thereby retard or eliminate 
them. 
If a smoke belching factory were taxed for the amount of its 
downwind damages, then it would have a positive incentive to 
pollute less. Likewise, if the factory owners were offered a sub-
sidy to reduce sulfur oxide or particulate emissions there would be 
a positive incentive for them to do so. Finally, standards or or-
din.an.ces could be applied to the factory requiring a reduction in 
emISSIOns. 
As an alternative to these mechanisms, some economists have 
even suggested the creation of a market to purchase and sell the 
rights for emitting pollutants into water courses or the atmos-
sphere. 21 The rationale behind this scheme is that those downwind 
could then reduce emissions by buying up these rights. If it 
is worth less to them to have clean air than to the factory 
for polluting the air, the factory will be able to outbid the down-
wind recipients for these rights. This scheme is of course highly 
dependent on the efficacy of the existing distribution of income, 
so fortunately has heretofore evaded consideration as a viable 
policy alternative. In fact, there is evidence accumulating which 
suggests that recipients of pollution are largely the poor with little 
or no political or economic ability to induce a betterment of their 
environment. 
For the economy to achieve some sort of most efficient state in 
the presence of externalities according to Paretian efficiency, any 
set of taxes, subsidies, or standards cannot be levied. For the sake 
of efficiency, a balance must be struck between the social 
damages induced by pollutant emissions and the costs to society 
for control. To explain the derivation of optimal control of ex-
ternalities, let us take the case of automotive emissions. The con-
ventional economic wisdom answer is that as long as the costs of 
imposing an additional control measure on automobiles (such as 
installation of the catalytic muffler or an absolute yearly mileage 
limit per vehicle) are less than the reduction of damages or social 
losses resulting from its imposition, it pays to impose the addi-
tional control. The criterion is nothing more than the statement 
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that if benefits exceed costs for adding an additional emission con-
trol regulation, tax, or device, it is worthwhile. In addition, if each 
control measure can be varied (for example, higher or lower emis-
sion standards or different technical specifications for "add on" 
devices) then a second economic criterion can be stated: at the 
optimum level of emission control, the change in control costs re-
sulting from a change in the level of implementation of a control 
measure must be equalized wi th the change in damages induced by 
lower emissions resulting from the change in the control measure. 
Economists refer to these changes as "marginal control" costs and 
"marginal reduction" in damages respectively. In effect, this 
criterion specifies that the optimal level for implementation of 
any control measure is where marginal reduction in damages 
(benefits) equals control costs. If this criterion is not met (for ex-
ample, applying a slightly higher fuel tax will reduce damages by 
more than the increase in control costs), then changing the level of 
control (imposing a slightly higher fuel tax) will be economically 
efficient. Both criteria for optimal application of control measures 
boil down to two rather broad generalizations: an emission con-
trol measure should be considered for inclusion into the overall 
group of automotive emission control policies provided (1) its 
benefits exceed its costs, and (2) the optimal level for any control 
measure is either zero if it does not meet the first criterion, or 
where the difference between control costs and reduction in air 
pollution damages resulting from the control measure is the larg-
est. 
Two additional salient points must be added, namely: what 
should be included or excluded in the definition of control costs 
and damages, and how these en ti ties should be measured. Control 
costs normally would include all costs imposed on the public 
through administrative costs of the control program plus all 
losses of individuals due to the imposition of the control as, for 
example, the private expenditure for purchase and maintenance 
of smog control devices. Alternatively, damages by air pollution 
include all present and future social losses incurred because of the 
pollutants. Several damages related to the growth in automotive 
emission tonnages are: changes in human morbidity and mortal-
ity rates; aesthetic degradation through loss in visibility; destruc-
tion or disfiguration of the natural environment, such as the ef-
fects of oxidants on pine forests; damages to agricultural crops, 
livestock, and ornamental plants; and the need for greater con-
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finement (or less physical activity) during peak periods of smog. 
Of course, this is only a partial list, but in each case the damages 
listed impose a loss or burden on the public which is not taken into 
account by the individual when he operates a motor vehicle. 
By balancing control costs against damages and imputing a 
tax to the individual operator of the motor vehicle, the govern-
ment (aided by the orthodox economists) purportedly takes into 
account societies' losses due to automotive emissions and in so 
doing the economy is returned to a Paretian efficient state. In 
fact, it has been rigorously demonstrated that even in the pres-
ence of pervasive externalities associated with pollution, a set of 
taxes on all commodities would render a non-growing economy 
Pareto efficient provided certain behavioral and technological 
conditions were fulfilled. 22 The set of taxes would discriminate 
against commodities which caused relatively more environmental 
damages and encourage the purchase of those commodities with 
little or no societal damages associated with their production or 
consumption. However, in order to establish optimal taxes the 
State must know the preferences regarding environmental pollu-
tion of all citizens. Theoretically, this answer to the environmen-
tal problem appears satisfactory, but in our opinion, such a taxing 
system will not provide a complete or even a very important par-
tial answer to the real world dilemma of environmental pollution. 
The first problem is that of the explosion of numbers. For a 
truly efficient discriminatory tax system, the government would 
have to estimate literally billions of different tax rates. This is 
because almost every production process or act of consumption 
contributes a different mix of wastes to the total waste flow of the 
economy. When environmental pollution results from a single 
upwind factory, then a clearly defined tax system based on down-
wind damages is potentially possible. But in the case of automo-
biles, there are literally millions of sources, each with a different 
effect on society, depending among other things on the vehicle's 
condition, location, mode of operation, and time. The only con-
ceptual method of discriminatory taxation in such cases is to 
monitor continuously the operation of each and every automobile 
located in urban areas. Of course, such a monitoring system is not 
only patently absurd in terms of cost, but there are serious ques-
tions regarding individual freedom and rights to privacy involved 
in such continuous monitoring. 
If the literally billions of emission sources were not enough to 
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cast doubt on an efficient discriminatory taxation scheme, there 
are even more serious problems due to synergy of wastes. To illus-
trate the difficulty synergism induces into taxation mechanisms, 
assume there are two polluters. Polluter A emits oxides of nitro-
gen which alone causes $20.00 in damages, while polluter B emits 
reactive hydrocarbons which alone causes damages at $30.00. The 
combination of hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides with sunlight 
will interact to create photochemical smog, which may cause an 
additional $40.00 in damages. The difficult question is: Should 
polluter A or B pay the additional $40.00, or both? And ifboth, 
what should be the appropriate share? Unfortunately, economics 
cannot provide a meaningful answer. In consequence, a pollution 
tax system per se cannot be efficiently constructed when syn-
ergism of wastes occurs, and if the natural environment has one 
meaningful or unifying characteristic, it most certainly, is a 
hierarchy of synergistic processes. 
A third problem with discriminatory taxation schemes, which 
are in any sense optimal in the Paretian sense, is the requirement 
that social damages be known prior to the imposition of the tax, 
i.e., the amount of the tax depends on the amount of pollution 
induced societal damages. Thus, the economic system of efficient 
taxes (this applies to subsidies and ordinances as well) is predicated 
on the idea that damages must occur first. If there are no damages 
induced by pollutants then there is no externality. The problem of 
damages occurring before an extern ali ty may easily be explained 
away academically if the damages are small in value, but taxes 
after the fact offer little satisfaction to the families of patients with 
respiratory diseases who were prematurely killed by excessive air 
pollutant emissions. The major point we wish to make here is that 
in cases of small monetary damages such as increased cleaning 
bills for soot, a tax system as proposed by economists in the past 
might become a useful anti-pollution policy measure. For large-
scale environmental pollution problems such as photochemical 
smog, mercury, or DDT concentrations, etc., such taxing schemes 
based on damages already measured are analogous to the ma-
laria patient who decides to buy a mosquito net. The discrimina-
tory taxing system therefore offers no solution to preventing en-
vironmental damage until after the damage has been incurred. 
Thus, such taxing systems will not work for environmental pol-
lution which causes irreversible damages, and it is difficult to 
imagine any important act of pollution that once encountered is 
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completely reversible; i.e., once the patient has emphysema, can 
he be completely healed such that he is identical to the human he 
would have been wi thou t the disease? 
A fourth debilitating aspect of discriminatory taxes for resolv-
ing the pollution problem is that pollution taxes per se will do 
little to solve the basic trade-off between an expanding economy 
and expanding amounts of waste. Discriminatory taxes may re-
duce the number of high polluting automobiles relative to "clean" 
automobiles but will not markedly influence the growing number 
of total automobiles unless a much more comprehensive taxation 
system were implemented. 
It appears as a matter of public policy that completely com-
prehensive discriminatory taxation systems, while theoretically 
sound, are not practicable. This is not to say that in certain in-
stances discriminatory taxes cannot be used. In fact they can, but 
only as very crude guideposts with only a vague connection to 
actual or poten tial damages. 
SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR CONTROLLING EXTERNALITIES 
If it is impossible for the State to optimally correct for exter-
nalities through discriminatory taxes in complex industrial socie-
ties and it is highly questionable on normative grounds what sort 
of benefits would be achieved if it could, what is left? We believe 
that potential solutions can be found which, although not within 
the normal boundaries of classical economic answers, can ameli-
orate the effect of waste emissions. 
First, we would suggest that the government view the pollu-
tion problem not as one of millions of firms and individuals each 
requiring adjustments, but as a problem of the society as a whole. 
In so doing, public policy, instead of concentrating solely on regu-
lations at the firm or consumer level, would also be concerned with 
the aggregate flows of waste of the entire economy. If such a view 
is adopted, many of the Government's traditional tools of stabi-
ilization policy can be utilized to control environmental pollution. 
For example, a fiscal policy that emphasizes maintenance of 
high levels of aggregate demand, immediate consumption, and 
employment quite innocently also accelerates rates of waste gen-
eration and accumulation. Monetary policies aimed at easing 
credit have the simultaneous impact of increasing immediate 
waste flows via a positive shift in consumption but a negative im-
pact through encouragement of investment and thus retardation 
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in the flows of goods immediately "consumed" and added to the 
growing pile of waste. Selective instruments such as investment 
tax credits, depletion allowances, and capital gains provisions also 
have direct and indirect effects on the rate of consumption and 
the distribution of production between current consumption and 
waste and savings. Therefore, these policies also influence the 
potential rate of environmental deterioration. It is interesting to 
speculate whether the opponents of the oil depletion allowance 
considered the question whether such an allowance actually in-
creased the rate of waste flows, particularly automotive emissions 
or carbon monoxide and oxides of nitrogen. But if Government 
economic policies currently have the impact of accelerating waste 
generation and accumulation, these same policies, if reversed, can 
have the opposite impact. For example, if only extremely low 
depreciation allowances were allowed on corporate investments, 
this would encourage building durability into machinery, equip-
ment, etc., and discourage rapid obsolescence and disposal. Selec-
tive tax advantages for investment in recycling technology and 
direct subsidies of recycling industries could likewise reduce the 
flow of waste per dollar of gross national product. 
A second important long-run prescriptive policy which should 
be given legislative consideration is the imposition of a maximum 
limit on family income or expenditure. By constraining expendi-
ture of each family or individual, flow of wastes in the economy 
could be drastically curtailed. For example, restricting the yearly 
expenditure of a family of three now spending $30,000 a year to 
$20,000 per year, may reduce wastes generated directly and in-
directly by the family, by as much as one-third, or 15-30 tons of 
wastes per year. Of course, the exact impact depends on how each 
family affected shifts income toward or away from relatively 
high pollution commodities and saving versus immediate con-
sumption, as an income-expenditure restriction, is imposed. 
While there may be some reduction in efficiency of the work 
force since the Horatio Alger myth would become an artifact, such 
a limit has some additional benefits in reducing social conflicts re-
sulting between haves and have nots. This policy would in effect 
be the exact analogue of the guaranteed minimum income, but 
instead of placing a floor under incomes for the poverty stricken 
would place a ceiling on expenditure for the pollution stricken. 
Due to the closeness of analogy we shall dub this policy the guaran-
teed annual maximum expenditure proposal. 
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The reduction in efficiency of the efforts of the well-to-do, in the 
long-run, that would result from this imposed limitation would be 
partially offset by the increased incentives for the poor, since the 
expenditure limitation would be expected to redistribute income 
from the rich downward. But the net result would probably be a 
reduction of economic efficiency and a decline in the rate of 
economic growth. This, we believe, is desirable. Growth for its 
own sake can only be justified when an economy cannot guarantee 
its citizens a substantial degree of economic security and a rea-
sonable standard of subsistence. One of the main social functions 
of economic growth in the United States in the past was to miti-
gate social conflicts caused by the inequality of the distribution 
of income. Economic growth permits a constantly increasing level 
of consumption for the poor while simultaneously keeping an al-
most identical relative position for the wealthy as their incomes 
increase. This entire process is, of course, poisoning our environ-
ment and degrading in many ways to the general quality of our 
lives. The spiraling process could be slowed or stopped, and 
economic inequality significantly mitigated by such a maximal 
expenditure policy. 
A final and important policy prescription for environmental 
pollution evolves from a simple idea but is extremely hard to 
implement. Some readers may have questioned whether belching 
at social gatherings is really an externality. If accidental, it may 
be forgiven. If not, the individual may be socially ostracized, i.e., 
society through repetitive conditioning attempts to teach the in-
dividual that such behavior is not acceptable, and usually suc-
ceeds. Then why not make polluting the environment an un-
acceptable social act? Specifically, any action by the individual 
which does not conserve and utilize the environment in the most 
limited, yet sustainable wa y is sociall y unacceptable. Owning three 
automobiles when two will do, or using disposable milk bottles 
would become the equivalent of an individual defecating on the 
sidewalk. 
Of course, to induce such a planned shift in social behavior 
would be a massive undertaking. But at least a start is perceived 
in on-campus recycling efforts, resurgence of interest of conserva-
tion groups, and growth of anti-pollution organizations. Such 
activities should be explicitly subsidized by the Government to 
encourage environmental awareness and an encompassing con-
servation ethic. 
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Economists in the main, because of their assumption that in-
dividuals largely act only in self-interest have placed extreme lim-
its on their proposed solutions to the environmental problem. To 
quote a recent Nobel Prize winning economist, Paul Samuelson: 
It is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pre-
tend to have less interest in a given collective consumption activity 
[clean air] than he really has.23 
Why? Because it is assumed that ifhe acts as a purely hedonistic 
individual, he will be better off. Of course, this is pure tripe since 
citizens actively do act in the public interest. Even the worst in-
dustrial polluters in most instances have spent some profits, 
though too little, on abating pollution. When Los Angeles resi-
dents were recently exposed to a gasoline called "F-310" which 
purportedly reduced pollution, sales of this brand of gasoline in-
creased drastically. But economics continues to be plagued by the 
doctrine of self-interest. Economists have attempted to make self-
interest work for society by advocating the use of pollution taxes 
and implicitly prescribing that self-interest in the aggregate 
makes for a better world. What needs to be accomplished is a 
persuasion of the populace away from the doctrine of self-interest 
and toward a doctrine of cooperation and conservation. A doc-
trine in which self-interest is realized but is not the dominant 
theme-where man is cognizant not only of his own gains but 
of nature's losses. Such a cooperative movement cannot occur 
without an extensive, government subsidized educational pro-
gram. In the economist's parlance, conservation and a less ex-
travagant existence must become a superior good-a good iden-
tified with the best or opulence . 
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